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overestimating human error in ex post facto analysis can
be dangerous.
Why do states withdraw their troops? The answer is
based on decision makers' perceptions of changes in
global politics, enemy composition, resource base, and
home public support. In the end, new administrations
had to come to power to replace the prevailing intervention strategy and get out. The message is that old
leaders continue policy patterns, and only new ones
may change the course.
This study rejects the notion that policymakers are
universally unwise, motivated by grandeur or ideology,
or that they have distinct human limitations. In fact,
leaders are judged neither harshly nor favorably. Protractedness is not the result of foolishness of choice but
murkiness of the situation. Cohen, in summarizing the
progressive stage of interventions, argues that the middle game is hard to evaluate for success or effectiveness.
Assessments are muddy, and a general fog prevails,
limiting clear understanding.
In the end, conclude the editors, foreign military
interventions are unpredictable, complex, destructive,
and difficult to evaluate on a cost-benefit scale. Why?
Because the cases chosen emphasize these factors, and
the framework cannot screen out noise. On a broader
note, intervention may continue to be characterized in
this way because, as part of international relations
conflict, political goals will continue to be advanced by
military means, opportunities and incentives for intervention will exist, and international controls marking
parameters of acceptable intervention will not be delineated.
An appraisal of this book must rest on the wisdom of
case selections and on the theoretical framework used to
extract information and build general patterns about
protracted military intervention. The emergence of a
new era in international relations characterized by intensified, violent nationalist movements, poses problems
relating to the balance between self-determination and
sovereignty and assessments of security and stability-in short, serious challenges for a potential intervenor. Are there guidelines for policymakers in this book?
Do scholars have a better understanding of the process
of intervention?
Many questions are still unanswered, yet the book is a
catalyst for anyone who wishes to probe the matter
further. In these cases, for example, if protracted interventions are costly and less than successful, we might
want to know more about the effects of policy planning.
Were the intervention strategies essentially random or
clearly planned? Were they outlined in both short- and
long-term frameworks? Did the introduction of military
troops to solve the conflict reconfirm or invalidate policymaker beliefs about force effectiveness? One acquires
no real perspective on these points, in spite of the
historical detail and conscious comparative analysis presented. The study lacks criteria to measure intervention
policy success and failure. What does each entail? What
degrees of difference exist? What happens once intervening states begin to realize that they may not achieve
their objectives? This choice is essentially one of flight or
fight; but since military intervention in this project is
conceived as a process composed of small steps, the
overarching strategy is hard to unveil. Perhaps including some short, successful interventions as case studies
might have sharpened the causal logic developed to
identify involvement and disengagement decisions. Al-

ternative design structures are often recommended over
a chosen research strategy, but the issue here is whether
substantial alteration in conclusions might have been the
result. This is hard to say.
The status of intervention as a key concept to understand contemporary world politics is rising. As a tool of
influence, it represents overt and covert involvement by
bigger states into the economic, social, and political
processes of weaker countries. It is a bulwark of power
politics. With the end of the Cold War and new domains
of conflict eruption, sovereignty and security demands
are unlikely to disappear from the international scene.
Today, humanitarian and collective intervention are the
frequently debated issues in official international circles;
but military force is still a significant part of the action. In
essence, this book is timely for its emphasis on military
force and contributes to our knowledge about dangers
behind protracted conflict involvement. This should be
useful in the current world environment of multiple
conflicts and attendant, ample temptations for intervention.
University of Denver
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Morality and American Foreign Policy. By Robert W.
McElroy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
194p. $24.95.
Traditions and Values in Politics and Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. By Kenneth W. Thompson. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992. 353p.
$37.50 cloth, $12.95 paper.
Though the contrasts between Robert W. McElroy's
Morality and American Foreign Policy and Kenneth W.
Thompson's Traditions and Values in Politics and Diplomacy are both real and apparent, that the contrasts
between these two readable and knowledgeable books
are not far greater than they are illustrates much of the
difficulty with the state of theory in the field of international relations.
McElroy's work is a dissertational effort to clarify the
gap between the realist and "internationalist" paradigms in international relations as well as build a "pathway" between them. It is a laudable first book. Decrying
the undoubtedly still great distance between ethics (or
philosophy generally) and the study of international
affairs, McElroy suggests properly if not originally that
the consideration of morality is inexorably bound to the
consideration if not the reality of international progress.
There is more than a hint of purposiveness here, although unfortunately the philosophical clarion to such
purposiveness is Immanuel Kant whose notions of the
universalization of international norms and a kind of
golden rule of international behavior reflect all too
vividly the usual Kantian requirement of intersubjectivity. It is no surprise, either within Kant or McElroy, that
substantive unanimity imports a methodology of interstate contractuality and that the search for a peaceful
and "regular pattern of interactions," therefore, still
lacks a convincing pathway. The dialectic, drawn from
Kant's "law of states" and Kant's "cosmopolitan law"
that would protect citizens within states, is categorically
obedient to the classificatory in ways that stifle progress
along intellectual and real world pathways.
How, then, to break out? As McElroy far less ashamedly has morality a part of foreign affairs than Thomp-
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son, McElroy places responsibility upon the individual
actor. It is the "moral politician" (Kant again) who must
triumph over the "political moralist," the latter given to
expediency and the former given to such departures
from traditional realism as a) Herbert Hoover's 1921
Russian relief effort, b) Richard Nixon's destruction of
America's chemical and biological weapons, and c)
Jimmy Carter's Panama Canal Treaty. By contrast, there
is Dresden, although here McElroy is too ready to write
of circumstances, the slowing of the Eastward infantry
drive in 1944, etc., than he is of the theoretical and actual
differences between moral and amoral choices.
In short, the weakness of McElroy's first book is not in
its scholarship or its writing. It is in its inability to yet
define a theory that would suggest how to propel the
moral norm towards intellectual and international
progress. Descriptiveness too often subverts prescriptiveness. McElroy settles for explanations of why the
clarity of the norm-and why better rates of moral
compliance occur when national security is less involved-predict
the moral choice. There is a link between the moral choice and the demands of someone's
"real" world to be sure, but it is not only involved with,
but dependent upon, the underlying linkage of international relations theory with both reality and the deepest
intellectual understandings of how both morality and
reality are known.
With Thompson, the gap between morality and reality
is wider still, Thompson's ambivalence about the place
of morality in international affairs being obvious from
the start. Substantively, this is a rich book, a bevy of
seedbeds for moral discourse being planted in discussions of nuclear security, disarmament, human rights,
and the conflicts over values that marked the decisions
of Lincoln, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon.
There are attempts to sew together the morality versus
reality threads that weave their way through the book in
chapters on history as end point or beginning, national
decline, and the openness of history when seen from
any contemporary perspective.
But Thompson's problem with perspectives, briefly
stated, is his lack of systematic differentiation. His
discussions of intellectual contrasts fail to deal with the
epistemological, that is the "forms of knowledge," differentiations that underlie all ethical positions. Thompson's oft written-of education, the University of Chicago's morally skeptical Morgenthau sharing top billing
with the ethical admonitions of Neibuhr, apparently did
not lead Thompson to an understanding of the role of
epistemology in theory. Thompson properly decries the
lack of continuity among "the seemingly endless repetition of intellectual and philosophical debates." But
even his worthy developmental portrayal of the movement from international law, through political, to institutional approaches within international relations studies, does not bind the development to commensurable
contrasts between methodological and epistemological
approaches. As a result, the thoughtful portrayal of
international realism never discovers the roots of the
almost static analysis of qualitatively similar variables of
human nature, state-to-state relationships, undifferentiated kinds of power, and the like. As a further result, the
less thoughtful but still credible depiction of idealism
finds the principle intellectual tension in international
affairs to lie within the dualism of each human nature,
not the differentiation between and among various human natures. Even the description of Lincoln's Sanitary
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Fair speech contrast between a man's living off the
"product of his labor" or "the product of other men's
labors" would leave one to think the tension's options
equally weighted. Did Lincoln think that? Does Thompson?
What is so frustrating is that Thompson, at least at
times, comes so close to seeing things, as they must be
seen if theoretical advancement is to occur, from the
intellectual top. His marvelous description of the maintenance of tensions within the foreign policy of Richard
Nixon, the best segment of the book, credits Nixon's
own deep understanding of that tension for the success
of the China strategy and other Nixon triumphs. But in
Thompson's general discussion of history, his proper
scoring of Fukuyama's wrongness about Hegel is dulled
by his own wrongness about Hegel. Thompson's earlier
attack on Hegel's drive for the imposition of the state on
a population fails to recognize the primacy of the ethical
state within Hegel's prescription. Yes, there is a deterministic rationality to Hegel, but it is an ascending,
differentiated rationality that Hegel strives for, and
Hegel deals with it through a dialectic of tension that is
epistemologically distinguishable from the dialectic of
Kant.
Not surprisingly, Hegel is suspicious of liberalism,
more so than Kant, but that squares with Hegel's dialectic dealings with ever more differentiated cognitive
variables. Kant's dialectic steadfastly held to the classificatory imperative. Kant's dialectic is a dutiful first
cousin to the Categorical Imperative that was at the
heart of all of Kant's thinking and, not surprisingly,
therefore, Kant saw perpetual peace as growing out of
the contractual form that McElroy identified. Hegel's
peace is the product of the engrossment of the ever more
complex intellectual and ultimately real world variables
that somehow reconcile today's reality and tomorrow's
thrust of the historical Idea.
Perhaps the greatest dialectic, for international relations theory as well as for the real world of international
relations, is the never ending conflict of Kant-like and
Hegel-like dialectics themselves. First and foremost,
both German idealists dealt with the core epistemological issues of the nature of knowledge, as well as the
limits to knowledge. It is on their epistemological writings, not the substantive writings on politics or peace,
that international relations theory should be built. Kant
did not believe in the synthetic, differentiated cognition
beyond the most restrictive notions of mathematics,
natural science, and personal morality. As a result, the
human purposiveness of his vision of international
affairs, like his vision of the improvement of knowledge,
was overshadowed by the hand of Providence. Hegel's
belief in the human capacity to understand ever more
differentiated, or synthetic, qualities of knowledge,
along with his belief in the expansion of the limits of
knowledge and morality, was the core of his optimism.
That Kant would reject the coming into objective consciousness of an ever-improving moral vision, and that
Hegel would depict the dialectic as a movement of
consciousness towards just such a vision are both understandable and commensurable. That proponents of
the realist and the idealist visions of international relations would differ over the cognitive reconcilability of
the two very different cognitive entities of reality and
hope is also understandable and commensurable. Indeed, it is the essence of the contrast between the realist
and the idealist perspectives.
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It is this contrast, I would hope, that the later books of
McElroy, and even Thompson, would speak to. If they
do, the progress of understanding in international relations will be as assured as the contrast between the
traumas of the present world and the peacefulness of the
world's future.

Universityof SouthCarolina
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Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political
Realism. By Miroslav Nincic. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1992. 200p. $37.50.
In this book, Miroslav Nincic examines, explores, and
refutes a notion promulgated by such proponents of
classical "realism" as Hans J. Morganthau and George F.
Kennan. The notion holds, in Nincic's words, that
"democratic foreign policy suffers from having to accommodate the sentiments of the public and its representatives, sentiments that are grounded in a combination of
factual ignorance and emotive drives that clash with the
tenets by which international affairs are best managed"
(p. 152).
In a nicely-organized and fluidly-written argument,
Nincic focuses on the American experience to examine
the impact of public opinion, of Congressional consideration, and of electoral politics on the development and
conduct of foreign policy. He argues that realist arguments essentially suggest three rules: ideals should not
be confused with interests, interests and power should
be "brought into proper balance," and "the actual conduct of foreign affairs should proceed in a measured,
consistent fashion" (pp. 22-23). He concludes that, in
general, democracy does quite well by these (rather
mushy) criteria.
mentality of the masses"-is
Public opinion-"the
really quite reasonable and coherent, he argues. While
the average American may not be terribly well-informed
about foreign policy, the public is not "particularly
disorganized, unstable, or extreme regarding foreign
affairs" (p. 45). In general, it appears to be "moderate"
and pragmatic, and its "normative goals are actually
quite close to the foreign policy preferences of the
leadership groups from which policy makers are generally drawn" (p. 52).
He reaches a similar conclusion about Congress. Although he acknowledges that "instances of misguided
comportment by the nation's legislators do exist," he
concludes that "examples of considerable Congressional
wisdom can also be found" (p. 64). And while conceding
that electoral politics can sometimes adversely affect the
conduct of foreign policy, he argues that there are also
positive benefits in elections as they enhance the exchange of ideas and hold political leaders accountable
for foreign policy failures (p. 119).
He also concludes that there has often been a tendency in American foreign policy for leaders to exaggerate, for domestic political reasons, the degree to which
there is an outside threat. In this, he may be overstating
the case somewhat. If the threat was indeed exaggerated, it seems to me that political leaders largely believed
their own exaggerations.
In the final chapter, Nincic wades into the decadeslong debate-for which the classic realists bear eternal
what is, after all, the "national
responsibility-about
interest." As he demonstrates once again, the more one

struggles with this concept, the more one becomes
enmeshed in muddled vapidities and "limp tautologies"
(p. 158).
He concedes that the concept might have some objective validity if it is very narrowly defined as a quest for
physical survival, economic health, and the continuance
of the society's basic normative order (p. 161). But even
that concession is questionable. The Soviet Union appears recently to have peacefully decided that its national interest lay in its own physical disintegration and
in a radical restructuring of its basic normative order.
Similarly, many leaders, such as the Ayatollah Khomeini
in Iran, would consider the economic health of their
country to be of only very secondary importance. Nincic
concludes that, in general, "a national interest emerges
only from an authentically democratic aggregation of
domestic preferences" (p. 168). That may be about the
best way to deal with the issue (apart from abandoning
it entirely), though it is not clear why the aggregation
has necessarily to be "democratic."
With his intentional focus on the American case,
Nincic specifically eschews a comparative perspective
(p. 24). In some important respects, however, his argument might have been strengthened with a bit of comparison. That is, while he argues convincingly that
American foreign policy has shown a fair amount of
moderation, coherence, and wisdom, his case might be
stronger if that experience were juxtaposed with the
alternative.
While democratic governments have made their share
of foreign policy blunders, these, it might well be
argued, pale in comparison to the foreign policy disasters non-democratic countries have experienced under
such leaders as Hitler, Mussolini, Kim Il-Sung,
Khomeini, Nasser, and Saddam Hussein. And one
might also look at the quality of the people democracies
have generally put forward to run their foreign policy,
comparing them to the similar products of non-democratic societies. The overall record for non-democracies,
after all, is fairly abysmal. Rebecca West may exaggerate
somewhat when she observes in Black Lamb and Grey
Falcon (1941) that in 645 years of rule the Hapsburg
family produced "no genius, only two rulers of ability
... countless dullards, and not a few imbeciles and
lunatics," but she is not that far off the mark. In such a
comparison, it would seem, democracies do rather well.
And a consideration of this sort might have served to
enhance Nincic's basic argument.

Universityof Rochester
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From Confrontation to Cooperation: Resolving Ethnic
and Regional Conflict. By Jay Rothman. Newbury
Park: Sage, 1992. 231p. $51.00 cloth, $24.50 paper.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s several scholars of
international relations developed conflict management
training workshops, the purpose of which was to support a process towards peace in the context of intractable
conflicts. John Burton, Leonard Doob, and Herbert
Kelman, among others, conducted "controlled communication" or problem solving workshops with high-level
representatives of groups involved in protracted communal disputes. John Rothman's book presents an extension of those early action/research projects. Applying
principles found in the conflict analysis and conflict
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